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1
Of Reasonableness, Fairness and
the Public Interest:
Judicial Review of Copyright Board
Decisions in Canada’s Copyright Pentalogy
graham reynolds

Introduction1

On 12 July 2012, five copyright law decisions were handed down
by the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC). These decisions have been
referred to (among other names) as the pentalogy (or the copyright
pentalogy).2 One of the more contentious topics addressed in the
pentalogy was judicial review of Copyright Board decisions. Two
of the five cases dealt with issues relating to judicial review of such
decisions.
In one case—Rogers Communications Inc. v Society of Composers,
Authors and Music Publishers of Canada [Rogers]—the SCC addressed
the standard of review that ought to apply to questions of law decided
by the Copyright Board. Rothstein J, who wrote the reasons for
judgment, held that the proper standard was one of correctness. In
concurring reasons, Abella J argued that the majority’s approach did
not give sufficient deference to the Copyright Board. Instead, Abella J
advocated for the adoption of a reasonableness standard to be applied
to questions of law decided by the Copyright Board.
In a second case—Alberta (Education) v Canadian Copyright
Licensing Agency (Access Copyright) [Alberta (Education)]—the SCC
1
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reviewed the Copyright Board’s application of fair dealing to a specific
set of facts (an issue which, as I will suggest in Part II.B, is ultimately
one of statutory interpretation).3 Alberta (Education) arose in the
context of the Copyright Board’s review of a proposed tariff applied
for by Access Copyright that would apply to the reproduction of
works for use in primary and secondary schools in Canada (outside
Quebec).4 One issue of disagreement with respect to this tariff was
whether short excerpts from textbooks reproduced by teachers and
distributed to students (referred to in the decision as Category 4
copies) met the test for fair dealing.
The Copyright Board determined that Category 4 copies did
not meet the test for fair dealing.5 This decision was appealed to
the FCA, which determined that the Copyright Board’s reasons
with respect to fair dealing were reasonable.6 The judgment of the
FCA was appealed to the SCC. Abella J, who wrote the reasons for
judgment in a 5-4 decision (McLachlin CJ and LeBel, Moldaver and
Karakatsanis JJ concurring), determined that the Copyright Board’s
decision with respect to fair dealing was unreasonable.7 Abella J thus
allowed the appeal and remitted the matter to the Copyright Board
for reconsideration in accordance with her reasons.8
Rothstein J, who wrote dissenting reasons in Alberta (Education)
(Deschamps, Fish and Cromwell JJ concurring), disagreed with Abella
J’s conclusion that the Copyright Board’s decision was unreasonable.
In his dissenting reasons, Rothstein J also implied that Abella J, in
reaching her conclusion, did not give adequate deference to the
judgment of the Copyright Board; or, said differently, that Abella J, in
spite of using the language of reasonableness, inadvertently applied a
correctness standard instead of a reasonableness standard.9
A pentalogy can be defined as “a combination of five mutually
connected parts”.10 Are the five copyright decisions handed down
by the SCC on 12 July 2012 mutually connected? Is there a coherent
narrative with respect to judicial review of Copyright Board decisions
in Canada’s copyright pentalogy? If so, what is this narrative? Is it
a story of inconsistency and inadvertence, where Abella J advocated
for deference in one decision11 yet did not give adequate deference
in another, as suggested by Rothstein J in his dissenting reasons in
Alberta (Education)? Or is there another story?
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In this chapter, I suggest that the story told in the pentalogy is
instead the story of the continuing evolution of the SCC’s interpretation
of the purpose of the Copyright Act, a process that began in Théberge
v Galerie d’Art du Petit Champlain inc. [Théberge]12 and which is
ongoing; of the nature of fair dealing and the fairness analysis; and of
the relationship between the Copyright Board and reviewing courts.
I will argue that the purpose of the Copyright Act, as interpreted
by the SCC, is to contribute to the development of a robust public
domain. In order to fulfill this purpose, it is necessary for courts
and the Copyright Board to adopt a broad, liberal approach to fair
dealing. I will suggest that in its decision in Alberta (Education), the
Copyright Board interpreted fair dealing in a narrow manner that—to
paraphrase the reasons for judgment of Moldaver JA (as he then was)
in Toronto Police Services Board v (Ontario) Information and Privacy
Commissioner [Toronto Police Services Board]—“[failed] to reflect the
purpose and spirit of the [Copyright Act] and the generous approach
to [fair dealing] contemplated by it.”13 As a result, the outcome reached
by the Copyright Board fell outside the range of “possible, acceptable
outcomes” (this range being defined as the outcomes that flow from
the adoption of an interpretation of fair dealing or an approach to fair
dealing that is consistent with the purpose of the Copyright Act, as
interpreted by the SCC).14 As a matter of law, it can thus be said that
it was not open to the Copyright Board to decide the question in the
way that it did.
Based on this argument, Abella J did not incorrectly apply a
correctness standard in Alberta (Education). Rather, Abella J applied
a reasonableness standard of review in a manner consistent with the
way in which reasonableness has been applied in Dunsmuir v New
Brunswick [Dunsmuir], in numerous SCC decisions handed down
post-Dunsmuir, and in several Canadian appellate decisions. As well,
based on this argument, Abella J’s reasons for judgment in Alberta
(Education) can be seen as consistent with her concurring reasons
in Rogers.
How, then, to explain Rothstein J’s dissenting reasons in Alberta
(Education)? One point of divergence between the majority and
dissent in Alberta (Education) relates to the nature of the fairness
requirement (the second step in the fair dealing analysis). Rothstein
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J’s dissenting reasons can be seen as being grounded in an assumption
that fairness is an open-ended discretionary concept; one that is
capable of multiple interpretations, none of which are preferable
over any other. If fairness is open-ended, then there would be little
scope for appellate review on a reasonableness standard. If this were
the case, almost any decision of the Copyright Board with respect to
fairness, provided it is transparent and intelligible, would fall within
the range of “possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in
respect of the facts and law” (as required by Dunsmuir).15
However, one conclusion that we can draw from Alberta
(Education) is that fairness (in the context of fair dealing) is not as
discretionary a concept as it appears to be. Alberta (Education) and
Bell clarify that the purpose of the Copyright Act requires a broad,
liberal approach to fairness. By implication, then, fairness is not
broad and open-ended; rather, it is infused with certain expectations
with respect to the way in which it is to be applied (namely, in a large
and liberal manner).
This chapter will proceed as follows. In Part I, I will briefly discuss
the (recent) history of judicial review of decisions of the Copyright
Board. In Part II, I will analyze Abella J’s reasons for judgment in
Alberta (Education) in light of Rothstein J’s implied suggestion, in
his dissenting reasons, that Abella J applied a correctness standard as
opposed to a reasonableness standard. In Part III, I will discuss the
implications of Alberta (Education) for fair dealing (and specifically
the fairness analysis), for future Copyright Board decisions, and for
the relationship between the Copyright Board and reviewing courts.
I:

Judicial Review of Copyright Board Decisions16

A. Introduction
In 2008, the SCC handed down its decision in Dunsmuir. In this
decision, Bastarache J and LeBel J delivered joint reasons for
judgment in which they “reassess[ed]” the “approach to be taken
in judicial review of decisions of administrative tribunals.”17 Two
determinations, made by Bastarache J and LeBel J in their reasons
for judgment, are particularly relevant for this chapter. First, they
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determined that the existing three standards of review (correctness,
patent unreasonableness and reasonableness simpliciter) ought to
be replaced with two standards—correctness and reasonableness.18
Second, Bastarache J and LeBel J concluded that “[d]eference will
usually result where a tribunal is interpreting its own statute or
statutes closely connected to its function, with which it will have
particular familiarity”.19
One question, following Dunsmuir, was the impact that it might
have on judicial review of Copyright Board decisions. The Copyright
Board is an “independent administrative tribunal”20 consisting of “not
more than five members, including a chairman and a vice-chairman,
to be appointed by the Governor in Council.”21 The chairman of
the Copyright Board “must be a judge, either sitting or retired, of
a superior, county or district court.”22 Through this requirement,
as noted by the FCA in Society of Composers, Authors and Music
Publishers of Canada v Canadian Assn. of Internet Providers [SOCAN
v CAIP (FCA)], “[t]he Act…ensures that the Board possesses legal
expertise.”23 Qualifications for the other members of the Copyright
Board, including the vice-chairman, are not explicitly set out in the
Copyright Act (its home statute). While there is no right of appeal
from Copyright Board decisions, these decisions are subject to
judicial review by the FCA.24 Would the SCC’s restatement of judicial
review principles in Dunsmuir impact the standards of review applied
to questions of law, questions of mixed fact and law, and findings of
fact made or decided by the Copyright Board?
B. S
 tandard of Review to Be Applied to Questions of Law
Decided by the Copyright Board
At the time Dunsmuir was decided, the leading case addressing the
standard of review on questions of law decided by the Copyright
Board was the SCC decision in SOCAN v CAIP.25 Binnie J, who
delivered the reasons for judgment in SOCAN v CAIP (McLachlin
CJ and Iacobucci, Major, Bastarache, Binnie, Arbour, Deschamps
and Fish JJ concurring26) concluded that the standard of review to
be applied to questions of law addressed by the Copyright Board is
correctness.27
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This determination was a departure from previous decisions in
which questions of law decided by the Copyright Board had been
reviewed on a standard of “patent unreasonableness.”28 This standard
had been applied by courts largely on the basis that courts perceived
the Copyright Board to be, as noted by Létourneau JA in Canadian
Assn. of Broadcasters v Society of Composers, Authors and Music
Publishers of Canada, “in a better position than…Court[s] to strike a
proper balance between the interests of copyright owners and users.”29
The first court to address the issue of the standard of review on
questions of law decided by the Copyright Board post-Dunsmuir was
the FCA in Shaw Cablesystems G.P. v Society of Composers, Authors
and Music Publishers of Canada.30 Citing Dunsmuir, the FCA held
that “[t]he Board is a specialist tribunal which deals extensively with
copyright matters. The Act is its home statute. It is therefore entitled
to deference with respect to its interpretation of that Act.”31
The FCA’s judgment in Shaw was appealed to the SCC, where it
was heard as Rogers (one of the cases in the copyright pentalogy).32
As noted above, the reasons for judgment in Rogers were written
by Rothstein J.33 Echoing the judgment of Evans JA in SOCAN v
CAIP, Rothstein J concluded that largely on the basis of “the unusual
statutory scheme under which the Board and the court may each
have to consider the same legal question at first instance”,34 and due to
concerns for consistency,35 the standard of review on questions of law
decided by the Copyright Board should be correctness.36
In her concurring reasons in Rogers (to which no other judge
signed on), Abella J critiqued Rothstein J’s reasons for judgment,
arguing strongly that courts ought to take a more deferential approach
to decisions of the Copyright Board. She did so in two main ways: first,
by advocating for a reasonableness standard of review to be applied
to questions of law decided by the Copyright Board,37 and second, by
offering a much more fulsome view of the role and mandate of the
Copyright Board than that suggested by Rothstein J in Rogers.38
With respect to the question of the standard of review that ought
to be applied to questions of law decided by the Copyright Board,
Abella J stated that “since Dunsmuir…this Court has unwaveringly
held that institutionally expert and specialized tribunals are entitled
to a presumption of deference when interpreting their home statute.”39
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In support of this statement, Abella J cited the SCC’s decision
in Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v Alberta
Teachers’ Association [ATA], which Abella J stated stands for the
proposition that “deference on judicial review is presumed any time
a tribunal interprets its home statute.”40 Abella J characterized the
approach adopted by the majority in Rogers—which she summarized
as “[a]pplying a correctness standard of review on the sole basis
that a court might interpret the same statute”41—as an “anomalous
jurisprudential relapse”,42 the consequences of which are to “effectively
[drain] expert tribunals of the deference and respect they are owed.”43
In dismissing the majority’s concern about inconsistent results
that might flow from the adoption of a reasonableness standard of
review when judicially reviewing Copyright Board decisions, Abella
J characterized the Copyright Board as a body with “particular
familiarity and expertise with the provisions of the Copyright Act”.44
She stated:
The Act may sometimes be home to other judicial actors
as part of their varied adjudicative functions, but their
occasional occupancy should not deprive the Board of
the deference it is entitled to as the permanent resident
whose only task is to interpret and apply the Act.45
This statement implicitly rejects Binnie J’s characterization of the
Copyright Act, in SOCAN v CAIP, as an “act of general application
which usually is dealt with before courts rather than tribunals”.46
Binnie J’s characterization was accepted by Rothstein J in his reasons
for judgment in Rogers.47
In addition to disagreeing on the question of which standard of
review ought to apply to questions of law decided by the Copyright
Board, Abella J and Rothstein J, in their respective reasons in Rogers,
also presented very different views of the role and mandate of the
Copyright Board. In his reasons, Rothstein J affirmed Binnie J’s
statement in SOCAN v CAIP that “the core of the Board’s mandate is
‘the working out of the details of an appropriate royalty tariff ’.”48
Objecting to the characterization of the Copyright Board as a
mere rate-setter, Abella J instead provided a much more expansive
view of the role of the Copyright Board. She stated:
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The Board has specialized expertise in interpreting the
provisions of the Copyright Act. … The Board does not
simply “wor[k] out…the details of an appropriate royalty
tariff ”, despite what is suggested in [SOCAN v CAIP],
at para. 49. It sets policies that collectively determine
the rights of copyright owners and users, and plays an
important role in achieving the proper balance between
those actors.49
In advocating for a reasonableness standard of review for
questions of law that are decided by the Copyright Board, and in
offering a broad interpretation of the Copyright Board and its
mandate (as opposed to the interpretation of the board’s mandate as
set out by the majority), Abella J provided, in her concurring reasons
in Rogers, a robust defence of a deferential approach to decisions of
the Copyright Board.
C. S
 tandard of Review to Be Applied to Findings of Fact and
Questions of Mixed Fact and Law Made or Decided by the
Copyright Board
In Dunsmuir, Deschamps J (Charron and Rothstein JJ concurring)
wrote that in the context of administrative review, deference is
owed by reviewing courts both with respect to findings of fact and
questions of mixed fact and law made or decided by administrative
bodies (implying a reasonableness standard of review).50 The first
court, post-Dunsmuir, to address the issue of the proper standard
to be applied to findings of fact made by the Copyright Board was
the FCA in Alberta (Education) (FCA).51 In this decision, the FCA
confirmed that the standard of review to be applied when reviewing
findings of fact made by the Copyright Board was reasonableness.52
This conclusion was upheld by Abella J in Alberta (Education).53 In
Canadian Recording Industry Association v Society of Composers,
Authors and Music Publishers of Canada, the FCA confirmed that
questions of mixed fact and law decided by the Copyright Board are
also reviewed on a reasonableness standard.54
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II: T
 he Reasonableness Standard Applied:
Analyzing Abella J’s Reasons in Alberta (Education)
A. Introduction
In this Part, I will focus on Abella J’s application of the reasonableness
standard in her reasons in Alberta (Education). As noted above, while
Abella J (who wrote the majority decision) and Rothstein J (who wrote
dissenting reasons) agreed that the question of whether photocopies
made by teachers for their students qualified as fair dealing ought to
be reviewed on a reasonableness standard,55 they disagreed both on
how this standard ought to be applied and on the ultimate conclusion
(namely, whether the Copyright Board’s decision with respect to fair
dealing was unreasonable).
Prior to the pentalogy, the leading SCC case to address fair
dealing was CCH.56 CCH dealt with copyright infringement actions
brought by legal publishers CCH Canadian Ltd., Thomson Canada
Ltd. and Canada Law Book Ltd. against the Law Society of Upper
Canada (LSUC). The publishers alleged, among other claims, that the
LSUC—which, “[s]ince 1845…has maintained and operated the Great
Library at Osgoode Hall in Toronto, a reference and research library
with one of the largest collections of legal materials in Canada”57—
had infringed copyright by “providing [a] custom photocopy service
in which single copies of the publishers’ works are reproduced and
sent to patrons upon their request [and by]…maintaining self-service
photocopiers and copies of the publishers’ works in the Great Library
for use by its patrons”.58
In the course of her decision (in which she found that the LSUC had
not infringed copyright), McLachlin CJ, writing for the Court, made
several statements with respect to the nature and scope of fair dealing.
Specifically, McLachlin CJ noted that fair dealing is an “integral part of
the Copyright Act”;59 that it is a “user’s right”;60 and that “[i]n order to
maintain the proper balance between the rights of a copyright owner
and users’ interests, it must not be interpreted restrictively”.61
Fair dealing is the broadest defence to copyright infringement
available under the Copyright Act.62 Under fair dealing, individuals
have, in certain circumstances, the “right” to use a substantial amount
of copyright-protected expression without the authorization of the
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copyright owner.63 The fair dealing analysis proceeds in two steps.
First, it must be established that the dealing was done for one of eight
purposes, namely research, private study, education, parody, satire,
criticism, review and news reporting.64 Dealings done for the purpose
of criticism, review or news reporting, in order to be considered fair,
must also satisfy certain attribution requirements.65 Second, it must
be established that the dealing was “fair.”66
With respect to the second part of the fair dealing analysis,
McLachlin CJ, in CCH, noted that “[t]he Copyright Act does not
define what will be fair; whether something is fair is a question of fact
and depends on the facts of each case”.67 In support of this statement,
she cited the judgment of Lord Denning M.R. in Hubbard v Vosper
[Hubbard] in which he noted that “[i]t is impossible to define what is
‘fair dealing’. It must be a question of degree…after all is said in done,
it must be a matter of impression.”68
In the attempt to provide some guidance to future decision makers
with respect to the fairness analysis, McLachlin CJ set out a list of
factors outlined originally by Linden JA that, in the view of the SCC,
“provides a useful analytical framework to govern determinations
of fairness in future cases”.69 Specifically, based on CCH, factors that
may be considered are the purpose of the dealing, the character of
the dealing, the amount of the dealing, alternatives to the dealing, the
nature of the work, and the effect of the dealing on the work.70
As described earlier, in Alberta (Education), in the context of
reviewing the tariff proposed by Access Copyright, the Copyright
Board determined that short excerpts from textbooks reproduced
by teachers and distributed to students did not meet the test for fair
dealing. This determination was reviewed first by the FCA (which held
that it was reasonable) and subsequently by the SCC. In her decision,
Abella J concluded that “the Board’s finding of unfairness was based
on…a misapplication of the CCH factors.”71 As a result, Abella J held
that “its outcome was rendered unreasonable.”72 Consequently, Abella
J allowed the appeal and remitted the matter to the Copyright Board
for reconsideration based on her reasons.73
Rothstein J, in his dissenting reasons, disagreed with Abella J,
stating that “[i]n my view, the Board made no reviewable error in
principle in construing the CCH factors and, with one relatively minor
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exception, its factual analysis, application of the CCH factors to the
facts and its conclusions were not unreasonable.”74 Rothstein J also
objected to what he viewed as the approach taken by Abella J in her
reasons for judgment, implying that Abella J did not give adequate
deference to the Copyright Board with respect to its analysis of the
fairness (or CCH) factors. As Rothstein J stated: “The application of
these factors to the facts of each case by the Copyright Board should
be treated with deference on judicial review. A principled deferential
review requires that courts be cautious not to inadvertently slip into a
more intrusive, correctness review.”75
Rothstein J’s contention that Abella J did not give adequate
deference to the Copyright Board in her decision in Alberta (Education)
merits further analysis, particularly given Abella J’s concurring reasons
in Rogers in which Abella J called for greater deference to be given to
decisions of the Copyright Board. What can explain this outcome?
As noted above, one explanation—alluded to by Rothstein
J, in his dissenting reasons in Alberta (Education), is that Abella J,
in her reasons for judgment in Alberta (Education), “inadvertently
[slipped] into a more intrusive, correctness review.”76 Based on this
explanation, Abella J did not give adequate deference to the decision
of the Copyright Board; rather, she simply substituted her judgment
for that of the Copyright Board. This explanation, however, implies
an inconsistency between Abella J’s decision in Alberta (Education)
and her concurring reasons in Rogers—that Abella J advocated for
deference to be given to determinations of the Copyright Board in one
case, yet failed to give deference in another. Such an inconsistency—
particularly given that Rogers and Alberta (Education) were heard by
the SCC on back-to-back days, and the judgments delivered on the
same day—would be surprising.
I suggest that there is another explanation. Specifically, in this
Part, I suggest that the Copyright Board, in applying fair dealing to
a specific set of facts, adopted an approach to fair dealing that was
inconsistent with the purpose of the Copyright Act, as interpreted by
the SCC. In so doing, it reached an outcome that fell outside of the
range of possible, acceptable outcomes. As a result, Abella J’s decision
to allow the appeal did not reflect a lack of deference to the decision
of the Copyright Board.
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In the next section of this Part, I will describe the application
of the reasonableness standard, post-Dunsmuir, in the context of
statutory interpretation. While the question of “whether something
is fair is a question of fact”, as noted by McLachlin CJ in CCH,77 the
question of how to interpret and apply fair dealing is ultimately a
question of statutory interpretation. The interpretation or approach
adopted by a court or the Copyright Board to fair dealing is (or ought
to be) informed by their view of the purpose of the legislation as a
whole. Thus interpreted, fair dealing is applied to the facts of the case,
making the question dealt with in Alberta (Education) a question of
mixed fact and law, reviewable on a reasonableness standard.78 In
numerous judgments, as will be described below, reviewing courts
have found decisions of administrative bodies to be unreasonable on
the basis that the administrative body adopted an interpretation of
the statutory provisions in question that was inconsistent with the
purpose of the legislation, as interpreted by the reviewing court.
B. Th
 e Application of the Reasonableness Standard in the
Context of Statutory Interpretation
In Dunsmuir, the SCC describes reasonableness as a
[D]eferential standard animated by the principle that
underlies the development of the two previous standards
of reasonableness: certain questions that come before
administrative tribunals do not lend themselves to one
specific, particular result. Instead, they may give rise to
a number of possible, reasonable conclusions. Tribunals
have a margin of appreciation within the range of
acceptable and rational solutions. A court conducting a
review for reasonableness inquires into the qualities that
make a decision reasonable, referring both to the process
of articulating the reasons and to outcomes. In judicial
review, reasonableness is concerned mostly with the
existence of justification, transparency and intelligibility
within the decision-making process. But it is also
concerned with whether the decision falls within a range
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of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in
respect of the facts and law.79
In Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union v Newfoundland
and Labrador (Treasury Board) [NLNU],80 Abella J (writing for
the Court) clarified the approach taken by reviewing courts in
determining whether a decision of an administrative decision maker
is unreasonable.81 Rather than requiring the reviewing court to
engage in “two discrete analyses—one for the reasons and a separate
one for the result”, Abella J described the reasonableness analysis as a
“more organic exercise—the reasons must be read together with the
outcome and serve the purpose of showing whether the result falls
within a range of possible outcomes.”82
As noted in Catalyst Paper Corp. v North Cowichan (District)
(following Dunsmuir), “reasonableness must be assessed in the
context of the particular type of decision making involved and all
relevant factors”.83 In the context of cases in which the issue being
reviewed involves the tribunal’s interpretation of a specific statutory
provision, many reviewing courts engage in a process of statutory
interpretation in order to determine whether the “decision falls
within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible
in respect of the facts and law.”84 Abella J, who delivered the judgment
of the Court in Celgene Corp. v Canada (Attorney General) [Celgene],
described “statutory interpretation [as] involv[ing] a consideration of
the ordinary meaning of the words used and the statutory context in
which they are found…. The words, if clear, will dominate; if not, they
yield to an interpretation that best meets the overriding purpose of
the statute”.85
Reviewing courts engage in the process of statutory interpretation,
at least theoretically, not to determine whether they would agree
with the outcome reached by the tribunal (this would be an
inappropriate application of the correctness standard in the context
of a reasonableness analysis), but to determine the range of possible
outcomes (thus allowing the reviewing court to determine whether
the tribunal’s decision fell within the range of possible, acceptable
outcomes, even if it is not the outcome that the reviewing court itself
would have adopted).86
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This is not to say, however, that some courts engaged in this
process of statutory interpretation do not “inadvertently slip into
a more intrusive, correctness review”.87 This concern was noted by
Binnie J in ATA.88 Binnie J pointed to two cases—Dunsmuir89 and
Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) v Canada (Attorney
General) [CHRC]90—in which he argued that “the intensity of
scrutiny” applied by the reviewing courts was “not far removed from
a correctness analysis”.91 Similarly, Gus Van Harten, Gerald Heckman
and David J. Mullan have noted that
[o]ccasionally, there are cases, usually involving issues
of legal interpretation, where a court applies the
reasonableness standard in a way that appears to show
little if any deference to the decision-maker. In such
cases, it is pertinent to ask whether the court carried
through on its commitment to defer or whether, instead,
the court engaged in correctness review ‘in disguise.’92
In addition to questioning whether some reviewing courts might
use this process to engage in “correctness review ‘in disguise’”,93 it
can also be asked, more broadly, how the range of possible outcomes
should be determined. In the context of a case involving statutory
interpretation, should the court’s determination of statutory
purposes trump that of the administrative tribunal? This approach
sits uneasily with the idea of “deference as respect” articulated by
David Dyzenhaus and adopted by the SCC in Dunsmuir.94 Rather, it
seems to perpetuate a policy of judicial supremacy over the actions of
administrative tribunals.95
The resolution of this question is beyond the scope of this
chapter to address. Instead, this chapter will merely note that the
approach to the reasonableness analysis described above, in which
the reviewing court determines whether the outcome reached by the
tribunal falls within the range of possible, acceptable outcomes after
having engaged in the process of statutory interpretation in order to
ascertain the range of outcomes, has been adopted in numerous SCC
and Canadian appellate decisions since Dunsmuir.
In many of these cases, reviewing courts have found decisions
of administrative tribunals to be unreasonable, at least in part on
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the basis that the tribunal’s approach to or interpretation of specific
statutory provisions was inconsistent with the purpose of the statute,
as interpreted by the reviewing court. In Dunsmuir, for instance,
Bastarache and LeBel JJ critiqued the “reasoning process of the
adjudicator”, suggesting that it was “deeply flawed” in that “[i]t relied
on and led to a construction of the statute that fell outside of the range
of admissible statutory interpretations”.96
A similar approach was adopted in CHRC.97 After having
engaged in an interpretive process to determine the range of possible
outcomes, LeBel and Cromwell JJ (McLachlin CJ and Deschamps,
Abella, Charron and Rothstein JJ concurring), stated that
[i]n our view, the text, context and purpose of the
legislation clearly show that there is no authority in the
Tribunal to award legal costs and that there is no other
reasonable interpretation of the relevant provisions.
Faced with a difficult point of statutory interpretation
and conflicting judicial authority, the Tribunal adopted
a dictionary meaning of “expenses” and articulated what
it considered to be a beneficial policy outcome rather
than engage in an interpretive process taking account of
the text, context and purpose of the provisions in issue.
In our respectful view, this led the Tribunal to adopt an
unreasonable interpretation of the provisions.98
In Halifax (Regional Municipality) v Canada (Public Works
and Government Services) [HRM]99 (Cromwell J, writing for the
Court), the Minister of Public Works and Government Services’
determination that “roughly 40 acres of the Halifax Citadel National
Historic Site of Canada has only nominal value for the purposes of
municipal taxation”100 was held to be unreasonable on the basis that
it was “inconsistent with the Act’s purpose”.101 As the Minister had
adopted an approach that would “[defeat] Parliament’s purpose”, the
outcome reached as a result of this approach was determined to fall
outside the range of possible, acceptable outcomes.102
This type of approach to the reasonableness analysis has also
been adopted in several decisions of appellate courts. For instance, in
Toronto Police Services Board, Moldaver JA (as he then was) (Sharpe
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and Blair JJA concurring) restored the order of the Adjudicator and
set aside the order of the Divisional Court (which had found the
Adjudicator’s interpretation of s 2(1)(b) of the Municipal Freedom
of Information and Protection of Privacy Act to be unreasonable)
on the basis that “[t]he Divisional Court [gave] s 2(1)(b) a narrow
construction—one which…[failed] to reflect the purpose and spirit
of the Act and the generous approach to access [to information]
contemplated by it”.103
Celgene is an example of a decision in which the SCC determined
that the tribunal’s decision fell within the range of possible, acceptable
outcomes (and was thus reasonable) largely on the basis that the
tribunal’s decision was consistent with the purpose of the statutory
provisions, as interpreted by the reviewing court.104 In Celgene, Abella
J framed the question to be decided as whether the interpretation
adopted by the Patent Medicine Prices Review Board (Board)
of ss. 80(1)(b), 83(1) and 85 of the Patent Act was “justified.”105 In
order to determine the answer to this question, Abella J relied on
general principles of statutory interpretation, noting that the Board
adopted an interpretation of these provisions that was “guided by the
consumer protection goals of its mandate”106 and stating that “[t]he
Board’s interpretive choice is supported by the legislative history”.107
Abella J determined that in adopting an interpretation of ss. 80(1)(b),
83(1) and 85 of the Patent Act that was consistent with the Board’s
consumer protection purpose, the Board had reached an outcome
that fell within the range of possible, acceptable outcomes.
As this section has demonstrated, in a number of cases, reviewing
courts have found tribunal decisions to be either reasonable or
unreasonable on the basis that the tribunal had adopted an approach
to or an interpretation of statutory provisions that was either
consistent with or inconsistent with the purpose of the legislation,
as interpreted by the reviewing court. In the next section, I will
argue that consistent with the decisions described above, Abella J, in
Alberta (Education), determined that the Copyright Board’s decision
was unreasonable on the basis that it adopted an approach to fair
dealing that was inconsistent with the purpose of copyright, as
interpreted by the SCC.
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C. Th
 e Application of the Reasonableness Standard in Alberta
(Education)
a. Th
 e Continuing Evolution of the Purpose of the Copyright
Act, as Interpreted by the SCC
i. The Author-centric Approach to Copyright
In Bell, Abella J, writing for the Court, referenced the “authorcentric” view of copyright in her reasons for judgment.108 She described
this view of copyright as “focus[ing] on the exclusive right of authors
and copyright owners to control how their works were used in the
marketplace,”109 and cited Bishop v Stevens as an example of an SCC case in
which this approach to copyright was employed.110 Abella J’s description
of the author-centric approach to copyright can be seen as implying
that the purpose of the Copyright Act, under this approach, is to reward
and protect authors and copyright owners.111 As well, based on this
statement, it can be suggested that under the author-centric approach to
copyright, owners’ rights are to be interpreted broadly, while exceptions
to copyright infringement are to be interpreted narrowly. Interpreting
the Copyright Act in such a manner would be consistent with the focus
of the Copyright Act being on authors and copyright owners (and not on
users or the broader public interest, for instance). Citing Carys Craig,
Abella J noted that under the author-centric approach to copyright, “any
benefit the public might derive from the copyright system [is] only ‘a
fortunate by-product of private entitlement.’”112 Based on this statement,
it can be suggested that the author-centric approach privileges private
interests over broad consideration of the public interest.
In Bell, Abella J described the author-centric approach to copyright
as the “former framework” and the “earlier” view of copyright.113 This
choice of diction is significant. It implies that this view of copyright
was, at one time, the dominant conception of copyright in Canada. It
also implies that this is no longer the case. What, then, is the current
governing approach to copyright in Canada?

ii. The Instrumental–Public Interest Approach
Beginning in Théberge and most recently affirmed in the
pentalogy,114 the SCC has interpreted the Copyright Act as supporting
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a conceptualization of copyright as a mechanism (or instrument)
employed to achieve a specific outcome. I refer to this approach to
copyright as the instrumental–public interest approach. Under this
approach to copyright, the purpose of the Copyright Act is to advance
the public interest by contributing to the development of a “robustly
cultured and intellectual public domain”.115
Copyright contributes to the development of the public domain by
providing an economic incentive for the creation and dissemination
of works of the arts and intellect.116 This economic incentive spurs
the creation and dissemination of works that would otherwise not
have been created or disseminated. Once created and made public,
these works become available for certain types of unauthorized
uses (thus facilitating future creation and contributing to a vibrant
public domain). In order to ensure that the economic incentive of
copyright functions properly (and that individuals continue to invest
in the creation and dissemination of expression), copyright owners
must receive a “just” or “fair reward.”117 Ensuring a fair reward for
copyright owners is thus consistent with and advances the public
interest in a vibrant public domain. As such, it is an integral part of
the instrumental–public interest approach to copyright.
Interpreting the rights of copyright owners too broadly, however,
could negatively impact and run counter to the public interest.
To quote McLachlin CJ, the “public domain…flourish[es]” when
“others are able to produce new works by building on the ideas
and information contained in the works of others”.118 It becomes
impoverished if copyright owners are able to restrict, to too great
a degree, the ideas, information and expression contained within
their works.
Ensuring that information and expression is disseminated is
crucial in maintaining a vibrant public domain. Works that are
not disseminated (or that are not disseminated broadly) cannot
be accessed or used by others. As noted by Binnie J in Théberge,
“[e]xcessive control by holders of copyrights and other forms of
intellectual property may unduly limit the ability of the public
domain to incorporate and embellish creative innovation in the longterm interests of society as a whole, or create practical obstacles to
proper utilization”.119
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Recognizing that overcompensating copyright owners risks
harming the public interest in a vibrant public domain, the SCC has
taken several steps to limit the rights of copyright owners. First, it
has emphasized that the rights of copyright owners are of a “limited
nature”.120 As noted by Binnie J in Théberge, “[i]n crassly economic
terms it would be as inefficient to overcompensate artists and authors
… as it would be self-defeating to undercompensate them”.121 Second,
the SCC has also reframed exceptions, limitations and defences
to copyright infringement as “users’ rights”.122 Users’ rights help
to mediate “[e]xcessive control by holders of copyrights” and, as a
result, to protect the public domain.123 In so doing, users’ rights play
an “essential” role in “furthering the public interest objectives of the
Copyright Act”.124 Fair dealing, the broadest users’ right set out in the
Copyright Act, contributes to the development of a vibrant public
domain by giving individuals the right to reproduce, build upon and
disseminate works of the arts and intellect in various ways.
Under the instrumental–public interest approach, fair dealing
and other user rights are seen as an “integral part of the Copyright
Act”.125 As such, they “must not be interpreted restrictively”.126
The role played by the fairness analysis (the second step in the fair
dealing analysis) is particularly important in “balanc[ing] between
protection and access”127 and in advancing the public interest in a
vibrant public domain. Abella J has described the fairness analysis
as the part of the test in which the “analytical heavy-hitting is done
in determining whether the dealing was fair”.128 It is thus crucial,
under the instrumental-public interest approach to copyright, that
the fairness analysis not be interpreted restrictively.129 Under this
approach to copyright, both fair dealing (broadly) and the fairness
analysis (specifically) must be given large, liberal interpretations.
b. A
 bella J’s Decision in Alberta (Education) Focuses
on the Approach to Fair Dealing Adopted by the
Copyright Board
In his dissenting reasons, Rothstein J suggested that Abella J
“seize[d] upon a few arguable statements or intermediate findings to
conclude that the overall decision is unreasonable”.130 I suggest that
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this is not the case. Although Abella J does not explicitly ground her
decision in the text of Dunsmuir or other, more recent SCC decisions
in the area of administrative law, I suggest that Abella J—in a manner
consistent with the way in which Dunsmuir has been interpreted by
numerous SCC and Court of Appeal decisions, as described above—
found the decision of the Copyright Board to be unreasonable on the
basis that it adopted an approach to fair dealing that was inconsistent
with the purpose of the Copyright Act, as interpreted by the SCC. By
virtue of its adoption of such an approach, the outcome reached by
the Copyright Board fell outside the range of “possible, acceptable
outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law”.131
The contention that Abella J’s reasons for judgment focused on
the overall approach to fair dealing taken by the Copyright Board
and not to a few isolated statements or findings is supported by
reference to Abella J’s reasons for judgment. On numerous occasions
throughout her reasons for judgment, Abella J indicated that she
took issue either with how the Copyright Board “approached” a
fairness factor, or the “approach” taken by the Copyright Board in the
context of its fair dealing analysis. For instance, Abella J stated that
“[i]n my view, the key problem is in the way the Board approached
the ‘purpose of the dealing’ factor”;132 she distinguished several
authorities from the United Kingdom on the basis that “courts in the
U.K. have tended to take a more restrictive approach to determining
the ‘purpose’ of the dealing than does CCH”;133 she critiqued “[t]he
Board’s approach” for “driv[ing] an artificial wedge” into what she
states are the “unified purposes” of “teacher/copier and student/
user”;134 she stated that “[t]he Board’s skewed characterization of the
teachers’ role…also led to a problematic approach to the ‘amount of
the dealing’ factor”,135 noting that this was a “flawed approach”;136
she stated that she “[had] difficulty with how the Board approached
the ‘alternatives to the dealing’ factor”,137 noting that “the Board’s
approach” led to a “demonstrably unrealistic outcome”;138 and stated
that “[t]he final problematic application of a fairness factor by the
Board was its approach to the ‘effect of the dealing on the work’”.139
In the penultimate paragraph in her decision, Abella J connected
the Board’s approach to the outcome that it reached, stating that
“[b]ecause the Board’s finding of unfairness was based on what was, in
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my respectful view, a misapplication of the CCH factors, its outcome
was rendered unreasonable”.140
I will proceed by discussing the approach to copyright adopted by
the Copyright Board in Alberta (Education). I will demonstrate that
the Copyright Board, in its decision, adopted an interpretation of fair
dealing that was inconsistent with the purpose of the Copyright Act,
as interpreted by the SCC. In so doing, it arrived at an outcome that
was outside of the range of possible, acceptable outcomes.
c. Th
 e Approach to Fair Dealing Adopted by the Copyright
Board in Alberta (Education) was Inconsistent with the
Purpose of the Copyright Act, as Interpreted by the SCC
Although acknowledging that CCH is the “unavoidable starting
point of any analysis of fair dealing”,141 the Copyright Board, through
the course of its decision, interpreted and applied both CCH and
fair dealing more generally in a narrow, restrictive manner. Such an
approach is inconsistent with the purpose of the Copyright Act, as
interpreted by the SCC, namely to contribute to the development of
a strong, robust public domain.142 This purpose, as outlined above,
requires a large, liberal interpretation to be given to user’s rights such
as fair dealing.
The approach adopted by the Copyright Board, on the other hand,
is more consistent with the author-centric approach, under which the
purpose of the Copyright Act is to reward and protect authors and
copyright owners. The Copyright Board adopted such an approach in
order to have its analysis “conform with”143 article 9(2) of the Berne
Convention144 and article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement145 and to reach
the only result that it believed was consistent with these two treaty
provisions—a result it viewed as “self-evident”—namely, “that copies
made on a teacher’s initiative for his or her students either conflict
with the normal exploitation of the work or unreasonably prejudice
the legitimate interests of the rights holders” and as a result ought not
to satisfy fair dealing.146
The Copyright Board’s decision to interpret fair dealing in a manner
consistent with the Berne Convention and TRIPS Agreement—done
on the basis of its view that “the Supreme Court has been placing
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significant emphasis on treaties that Canada has not yet ratified; it
seems even more crucial to account for those that have been”147—is
not in itself necessarily unreasonable.148 However, both article 9(2)
of the Berne Convention and article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement
can be seen as presenting a view of limitations and exceptions to
copyright infringement that is inconsistent with the purpose of the
Copyright Act, as interpreted by the SCC. Both article 9(2) of the
Berne Convention and article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement portray
limitations and exceptions to copyright infringement as carve-outs
from the copyright owner’s exclusive rights, as opposed to integral
elements of the copyright scheme that must not be interpreted
restrictively. In interpreting CCH through the lens of these two
articles, the Copyright Board adopted an approach to copyright that
was more reflective of now-rejected interpretations of the purpose
of the Copyright Act—namely, to reward and protect authors and
copyright owners—than contemporary interpretations of its purpose,
as interpreted by the SCC.
The Copyright Board’s adoption of a narrow, restrictive
interpretation of fair dealing is evident in several ways that will be
described in more detail below. First, several statements from CCH
that point to the continuing evolution in the SCC’s interpretation
of the purpose of the Copyright Act were absent from the Copyright
Board’s decision in Alberta (Education); second, the Copyright
Board reframed one of the central conclusions reached in CCH in a
manner that is more reflective of now-rejected interpretations of the
purpose of the Copyright Act than contemporary interpretations of
its purpose, as interpreted by the SCC; third, the Copyright Board
repeatedly adopted a narrow interpretation of the scope of CCH;
and fourth, the Copyright Board made certain assumptions when
evaluating the fairness factors set out in CCH that led it to conclude
that the factors tended to unfairness. Taken together, these elements
of the Copyright Board’s decision suggest that the approach to fair
dealing adopted by the Copyright Board was inconsistent with the
purpose of the Copyright Act, as interpreted by the SCC.
As noted above, the Copyright Board began its fair dealing analysis
by stating that “CCH now is the unavoidable starting point of any
analysis of the notion of fair dealing”.149 It then set out what it viewed
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as the “substance of the propositions resulting from that decision”.150
The Copyright Board summarized CCH’s main principles as follows:
76 First, all exceptions provided in the Act are now
users’ rights. They must be given a liberal interpretation,
according to the purposes of copyright in general,
including maintaining a balance between the rights of
copyright holders and the interests of users, and the
exception in particular.
77 Second, the fair dealing exception applies only
to certain allowable purposes: private study, research,
criticism, review, and news reporting. Dealings for other
purposes are not covered by the exception, even if they
would otherwise be fair.
78 Third, dealings for an allowable purpose are not
ipso facto fair. The fairness of the dealing is assessed
separately, according to an open list of factors including
the purpose, character and amount of the dealing,
available alternatives, the nature of the work and the
effect of the dealing on the work.
79 Fourth, since all of the conditions for application
of the exception must be satisfied, the exception will not
apply as long as any one condition is not met.
80 Fifth, a practice or a system may constitute a
“dealing” just as well as an individual act. The exception
can benefit a practice or system if it is established either
that all of the individual dealings are research-based and
fair, or that the practice or the system itself is researchbased and fair.
81 Sixth, the notion of fair dealing is a legal concept
that must be interpreted according to the framework laid
down in CCH. […]151
Certain important elements of CCH are absent from this
summary. While the mere fact that “[r]easons may not include all the
arguments, statutory provisions, jurisprudence or other details the
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reviewing judge would have preferred…does not impugn the validity
of either the reasons or the result under a reasonableness analysis”,
as noted by Abella J in NLNU,152 the manner in which the Copyright
Board summarized CCH reveals inconsistencies, with respect to the
scope of defences to copyright infringement, between the approach
adopted by the Copyright Board and the purpose of the Copyright
Act, as interpreted by the SCC. Three elements of CCH, in particular,
are absent from the Copyright Board’s summary.
First, in CCH, fair dealing is referred to as an “integral part of
the Copyright Act”153 and an “integral part of the scheme of copyright
law.”154 Reference to fair dealing as being “integral” to the Copyright
Act is absent from the Copyright Board’s decision. This absence can
perhaps be attributed to the Copyright Board’s view that the Copyright
Act ought to be interpreted in a manner consistent with the Berne
Convention and the TRIPS Agreement. Conceiving of fair dealing as
an “integral” part of the Copyright Act can be seen as inconsistent with
the adoption of a view of fair dealing that is “confine[d]” to “certain
special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the
work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the
right holder”, as articulated in article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement.155
Second, in CCH, McLachlin CJ referenced Binnie J’s statement in
Théberge that one must not only “recogniz[e] the creator’s rights but…
giv[e] due weight to their limited nature.”156 Reference to the “limited
nature” of creator’s rights is absent from the Copyright Board’s
decision. Instead, the Copyright Board noted that its approach “helps
to ‘maintain the proper balance between the rights of a copyright
owner and users’ interests’ and avoid restricting them unduly (since
both copyright owners’ interests and users’ rights can be unduly
restricted)”.157 The idea that the Copyright Board should guard against
interpreting the Copyright Act in a manner that would unduly restrict
the rights of copyright owners (perhaps through a large and liberal
approach to users’ rights) echoes the language used in article 9(2) of
the Berne Convention and article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement, and is
more consistent with the author-centric approach to copyright than
with the purpose of the Copyright Act, as interpreted by the SCC. To
refer to the interests of copyright owners as being “limited”—as was
done in CCH —could be seen as being inconsistent with the language
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used in article 9(2) of the Berne Convention and article 13 of the
TRIPS Agreement, which focuses on the need for states to ensure that
exceptions or limitations to exclusive rights are not interpreted in an
overbroad manner.
Third, in CCH, in the context of discussing the originality standard,
McLachlin CJ stated that creating “safeguard[s] against the author
being overcompensated for his or her work…helps ensure that there
is room for the public domain to flourish as others are able to produce
new works by building on the ideas and information contained in the
works of others.”158 No reference to this statement, or to the idea of
the public domain more generally, is made in the Copyright Board’s
decision in Alberta (Education). Although the Copyright Board was
not required to include reference to this statement (or the concept
of the public domain, more broadly) in its reasons, its absence again
suggests an inconsistency between the approach adopted by the
Copyright Board and the purpose of the Copyright Act, as interpreted
by the SCC.
In addition to selectively quoting from and reframing elements
of CCH, the Copyright Board, through the course of its decision in
Alberta (Education), also repeatedly interpreted CCH in a restrictive
manner. It did so in several ways. First, while noting that the “notion
of research must be interpreted broadly,”159 a comment that draws
directly from the statement by the SCC in CCH that “‘[r]esearch’ must
be given a large and liberal interpretation in order to ensure that users’
rights are not unduly constrained,”160 the Copyright Board then stated
that “it appears that CCH did not challenge previous interpretations
of the notion of private study.”161 In making this statement, the
Copyright Board thus chose not to interpret CCH as authority for
the proposition that a “large and liberal interpretation” ought to be
applied to all fair dealing purposes (and not simply the purpose at
issue in CCH itself).162 As well as serving as a restrictive interpretation
of CCH, this statement is also inconsistent with the language used
by the SCC in CCH. Three paragraphs after stating that “‘research’
must be given a large and liberal interpretation,” the SCC broadens
the scope of this statement, noting that “the allowable purposes under
the Copyright Act, namely research, private study, criticism, review or
news reporting…should not be given a restrictive interpretation or

26 | THE COPYRIGHT PENTALOGY

this could result in the undue restriction of users’ rights”.163
Second, the Copyright Board, in the course of its decision,
relied on judgments in which a restrictive approach to fair dealing
was adopted. For instance, in support of its view that the purpose of
the dealing should be analyzed from the perspective of the teacher
or copier rather than from the perspective of the ultimate user, the
Copyright Board relied heavily on three decisions, two of which were
from the United Kingdom. As noted by Abella J, however, “courts in the
U.K. have tended to take a more restrictive approach to determining
the ‘purpose’ of the dealing than does CCH”.164 Thus, relying on
these decisions can itself be seen as inconsistent with the purpose of
the Copyright Act, as interpreted by the SCC (which mandates the
adoption of a large and liberal interpretation to fair dealing).
A third example of the Copyright Board’s application of a
restrictive interpretation of CCH is found in the way in which it
distinguished between the role of the teacher in a school and that
of staff at the Great Library. Describing these two roles as “scarcely
comparable”, the Copyright Board noted that165
[T]he teacher-student relationship is not the same as
that between the Great Library and lawyers. The Great
Library is simply an extension of a lawyer’s will. A
teacher does not merely act on behalf of a student, given
that, to a large extent, it is the teacher who instructs the
student what to do with the material copied.166
In constructing the comparison between teachers and staff at the Great
Library in such a manner, the Copyright Board narrowed the ambit
of CCH to situations in which an intermediary acts as an extension of
the will of the user. In so doing, the Copyright Board was able to avoid
overtly challenging the determination in CCH while concluding that,
in this instance, fair dealing was not made out.
The characterization of teachers adopted by the Copyright Board
(as performing a role very different from staff at the Great Library)
was not the only characterization that could have been adopted.
Instead of being seen as having roles that are “scarcely comparable”,
teachers and the staff at the Great Library could instead have been
seen as playing similar roles, in that both attempt to increase access to
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works of the arts and intellect. This appears to be the approach taken
by Abella J, who noted that “[t]he teacher…facilitates wider access
to [the] limited number of [purchased originals] by making copies
available to all students who need them”.167 This approach is consistent
with the purpose of the Copyright Act, as interpreted by the SCC.
A fourth instance of the Copyright Board adopting a narrow,
restrictive interpretation of CCH is found in the way in which the
Copyright Board interpreted CCH as indicating that in order for a
photocopy made by one party (A) for another party (B) to qualify
for the purpose of research, B must request the copy (thus imposing
a procedural requirement not dictated by the SCC in CCH). Abella J
pointed out that
Nowhere in CCH did the Court suggest that the lawyer
had to ‘request’ the photocopies of legal works from
the Great Library before those copies could be said to
be for the purpose of ‘research.’ On the contrary, what
the Court found was that the copies of legal works were
‘necessary conditions of research and thus part of the
research process’…. Similarly, photocopies made by a
teacher and provided to primary and secondary school
students are an essential element in the research and
private study undertaken by those students.168
The final way in which the Copyright Board interpreted and
applied fair dealing in a manner inconsistent with the purpose of
the Copyright Act, as interpreted by the SCC, is demonstrated in
the assumptions made by the Copyright Board when evaluating the
fairness factors; assumptions that led it to conclude that the factors
tended to unfairness and that, as a result, the dealing was not fair. For
instance, when evaluating the alternatives to the dealing factor, the
Copyright Board determined that it tended to unfairness on the basis
that there was an alternative to the dealing—namely, that educational
institutions could “[b]uy the originals to distribute to students or to
place in the library for consultation.”169 The assumption made by the
Copyright Board in the context of reaching this conclusion was that
schools could afford to purchase multiple copies of original texts to
distribute to students. The Copyright Board stated that “[t]he fact
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that the establishment has limited means does not seem to bar the
recognition of this point.”170 This is a curious statement, given that
in the previous sentence, the Copyright Board notes that this option
(namely, purchasing the book) is, “from a practical standpoint…not
open to the student.”171
On the basis of this assumption, the Copyright Board was able
to conclude that the alternatives to the dealing factor tended to
unfairness (a conclusion that contributed to the Copyright Board’s
ultimate conclusion that the dealing at issue was unfair). Abella J was
highly critical of the Copyright Board’s suggestion that schools could
“buy the original texts to distribute to each student,” describing this
suggestion as “a demonstrably unrealistic outcome”.172
With respect to two other factors to be considered in the fair
dealing analysis, namely the amount of the dealing and the effect of
the dealing on the work, the Copyright Board made assumptions,
in the apparent absence of evidence, that led it to conclude that
the factors tended to unfairness. In CCH, the SCC had noted that
in assessing the amount of the dealing, “[b]oth the amount of the
dealing and importance of the work allegedly infringed should
be considered”.173 In applying this factor to the facts of CCH, the
SCC noted that “[a]lthough the dealings might not be fair if a
specific patron of the Great Library submitted numerous requests
for multiple reported judicial decisions from the same reported
series over a short period of time, there is no evidence that this has
occurred.”174 In the absence of evidence, the SCC did not accept
this finding (and as a result, concluded that this factor tended
to fairness).
The Copyright Board, however, adopted a different approach in
Alberta (Education). Although noting that “it seems that teachers
generally limit themselves to reproducing relatively short excerpts
from a work to complement the main textbook” (a result which
should cause this factor to tend to fairness), the Copyright Board
then stated that “[on] the other hand, in our view, it is more than
likely that class sets will be subject to ‘numerous requests for…the
same…series’, which would tend to make the amount of the dealing
unfair on the whole.”175 It is unclear on what evidentiary basis (if
any) the Copyright Board reached this conclusion.176 Reaching this
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conclusion in the absence of evidence would be inconsistent with the
SCC’s decision in CCH, and with the purpose of the Copyright Act,
as interpreted by the SCC. One way to ensure that copyright owners’
rights are not interpreted in an overbroad manner is to insist on
evidence demonstrating the amount of the work that was used by the
party relying on fair dealing, and, in the absence of such evidence, to
decline to find that this factor tends to unfairness.
When analyzing the factor that addresses the effect of the dealing
on the work, the Copyright Board also made assumptions, in the
apparent absence of evidence, that led it to conclude that the dealing
was unfair. As noted by the SCC in CCH, the effect of the dealing
factor looks at whether the “reproduced work is likely to compete
with the market of the original work”.177 If so, “this may suggest that
the dealing is not fair”.178 Applying this factor to the facts of CCH, on
the basis that “no evidence was tendered to show…that the publishers’
markets had been negatively affected by the Law Society’s custom
photocopying service”,179 the SCC refused to find that “the market
for the publishers’ works had decreased as a result of [the copies in
question] having been made”.180
The Copyright Board, however, in its decision in Alberta
(Education), accepted the “uncontradicted evidence from textbook
publishers…that textbook sales have shrunk by more than 30 per
cent in 20 years”, noted that “[s]everal factors contributed to this
decline, including the adoption of semester teaching, decrease in
registrations, longer lifespan of textbooks, use of the Internet and
other electronic tools, resource-based learning and use of class
sets”,181 and, despite the fact that they were “not able to determine
precisely to what extent each factor [described above] contributed
to this decline”,182 concluded that “the impact of photocopies…is
sufficiently important to compete with the original to an extent that
makes the dealing unfair”.183 To paraphrase the SCC judgment in
CCH, although “no evidence was tendered to show that the market
for the publishers’ works had decreased as a result of these copies
having been made”,184 the Copyright Board still “conclude[d] that
photocopies made on a teacher’s initiative for his or her students have
an unfair effect on the works in Access Copyright’s repertoire.”185
Referring to the lack of evidence on this point as an “evidentiary
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vacuum”,186 Abella J criticized the Copyright Board’s conclusion that
the photocopies had a sufficiently detrimental impact on the original
to make this factor tend to unfairness, pointing out that “other than
the bald fact of a decline in sales over 20 years, there is no evidence
from Access Copyright demonstrating any link between photocopying
short excerpts and the decline in textbook sales”.187
In reaching its conclusion in the absence of such evidence,
the Copyright Board adopted an approach to fair dealing that is
inconsistent with the purpose of the Copyright Act, as interpreted
by the SCC. This purpose requires a large and liberal interpretation
to be given to users’ rights, and for courts and the Copyright Board
to ensure that the rights of copyright owners are not overprotected.
One way through which these outcomes can be achieved is to insist—
before concluding that the factor addressing the effect of the dealing
on the work tends to unfairness—on evidence either linking the
dealing with negative economic consequences for the work or works
in question, or establishing that the dealing resulted in negative
economic consequences.
In the above analysis, I have suggested that the approach to
copyright adopted by the Copyright Board is inconsistent with the
purpose of the Copyright Act, as interpreted by the SCC. Although
the Copyright Board framed its decision within the language of CCH
(in which the SCC continued the process of articulating the modern
understanding of the purpose of the Copyright Act as promoting an
instrumental–public interest approach to copyright), its decision was
shaped by its view that the outcome must “conform with” article 9(2)
of the Berne Convention and article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement.188
These two articles emphasize the ability of the copyright owner to
control and to profit from the use of his or her works. While they
contemplate (and accept) that there may be some limitations and
exceptions to owners’ exclusive rights, these exceptions are limited.
Such an approach, as described above, is inconsistent with the
purpose of the Copyright Act, as interpreted by the SCC, through
which both copyright and user’s rights work in concert to advance
the public interest by contributing to the development of a vibrant
public domain, and in which users’ rights are given a large and liberal
interpretation. Instead, the approach adopted by the Copyright Board
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is more consistent with the author-centric approach to copyright, an
approach that was explicitly rejected by the SCC in the pentalogy.
Under this approach, exceptions and limitations to copyright
infringement are narrowly interpreted in order to maximize the
rewards given to (and protection offered to) authors and copyright
owners.
As a result of its adoption of an approach to fair dealing that is
inconsistent with the purpose of the Copyright Act, as interpreted by
the SCC, the Copyright Board reached an outcome that fell outside of
the range of possible, acceptable outcomes (as defined by the SCC).
While some commentators question whether reviewing courts should
have the final say on determining the range of possible, acceptable
outcomes, such an approach, as outlined above, is consistent with SCC
and appellate jurisprudence both in Dunsmuir and post-Dunsmuir.
Thus, the conclusion reached by Abella J—that the Copyright Board’s
decision is unreasonable—can be seen as defensible under the
approach to the reasonableness analysis adopted in authorities such as
Dunsmuir, CHRC, Celgene, HRM, and Toronto Police Services Board.189
III: Significance of Alberta (Education)

What, then, is the significance of Alberta (Education)? What does
this decision portend for fair dealing, for the future of the Copyright
Board, and for Canadian copyright law more generally? With respect
to fair dealing, Alberta (Education) suggests that fair dealing is no
longer merely “a matter of impression”.190 Rather, it is rooted in and
shaped by the purpose of the Copyright Act, as interpreted by the
SCC—namely, to contribute to the development of a robust public
domain. This purpose requires a broad interpretation to be given to
fair dealing.
One question that flows from this conclusion involves the nature
of the fairness analysis. Rothstein J’s dissenting reasons in Alberta
(Education) can be seen as being grounded in an assumption that
“fairness” is a discretionary concept, one that is open-ended and
capable of multiple interpretations. In Rothstein J’s view, the Copyright
Board ought to be given wide latitude to apply the fairness factors
to the facts of a specific dispute as it sees fit.191 Such an approach is
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suggested in cases like Hubbard, cited with approval in CCH as well
as other Canadian copyright decisions.192 If Rothstein J is correct, and
if fairness is an open-ended, discretionary concept, then there would
be little scope for appellate review when applying the reasonableness
standard.
However, one conclusion that we can draw from Alberta
(Education) is that fairness (and fair dealing more generally) is not as
discretionary a concept as it appears to be (and as previous decisions,
including CCH, have suggested it to be). From CCH, we know that
the fair dealing categories are to be applied in a large and liberal
manner.193 Abella J’s reasons in Alberta (Education), read alongside
Bell, suggest that courts and the Copyright Board must also apply
fairness in a large and liberal manner.
In Bell, Abella J affirmed the importance of fairness both to fair
dealing and to the purpose of the Copyright Act. As stated by Abella
J, the fairness analysis is the part of the fair dealing test in which the
“analytical heavy-hitting is done in determining whether the dealing
was fair.”194 It is the core of fair dealing. As such, it plays a particularly
important role in “balanc[ing] between protection and access.”195
Consequently, it must not be interpreted restrictively. Abella J’s
reasons for judgment in Alberta (Education), in which she adopted a
large and liberal approach to fairness, can thus be seen as the logical
extension of—and an application of—her reasons in Bell.
The Copyright Board failed to apply a large and liberal approach
when evaluating fairness. Instead, it adopted a narrow, restrictive
interpretation of fairness (and fair dealing more generally). In so
doing, the Copyright Board adopted an interpretation of fair dealing
that was inconsistent with the purpose of the Copyright Act, as
interpreted by the SCC. This led it to arrive at an outcome that fell
outside of the range of possible, acceptable outcomes.
If, following Bell and Alberta (Education), fairness is now
considered to be rooted in and shaped by the purpose of the Copyright
Act, as opposed to being an open-ended, discretionary concept,
might the fairness analysis itself have to be modified to reflect this
shift? Is the list of factors outlined in CCH still a “useful analytical
framework to govern determinations of fairness”, as McLachlin CJ
referred to it?196 Should this “structured approach” be reformed to
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take into account the importance of fairness to fair dealing and to
the purpose of the Copyright Act, as articulated by Abella J in Bell? If
so, how might the fairness analysis be reformed? Should some factors
dominate or have greater weight than others? Are some factors now
irrelevant? Or, instead of modifying the “structured approach”, ought
it be abandoned entirely in favour of a new approach to determining
fairness (such as a proportionality analysis)? It remains to be seen
how these questions, which are beyond the scope of this chapter to
address, will play out in future jurisprudence.197
With respect to the future of the Copyright Board and its impact
on copyright policy, Alberta (Education) is authority for the principle
that reviewing courts can challenge decisions of the Copyright Board
on the basis that the Copyright Board applied the Copyright Act in
a manner that was inconsistent with the purpose of copyright, as
interpreted by the SCC. Post-Alberta (Education), failure to apply the
Copyright Act in a manner consistent with the purpose of copyright—
as interpreted by the SCC in cases such as Théberge, CCH, Bell, and
Alberta (Education)—can lead to the Copyright Board’s decision
being overturned by reviewing courts.
This is not to say, however, that Abella J is dismissive of the ability
of the Copyright Board to play a positive role in the development
of Canadian copyright law. Based on her concurring reasons in
Rogers, it appears that Abella J sees the Copyright Board as playing
an important role in this process. Respectful of the Copyright Board’s
expertise, Abella J would be prepared to defer to its judgments, even
with respect to questions of law.
Nevertheless, in Alberta (Education), Abella J emphasized that in
interpreting and applying the Copyright Act, the Copyright Board must
do so in a manner that is consistent with the purpose of the Copyright
Act, as interpreted by the SCC. This approach—sitting uneasily with
the idea of “deference as respect”198—is consistent with what Sheila
Wildeman refers to as an “[attitude] of judicial supremacy” through
which reviewing courts “[set] strict limits of legality within which
administrative reasoning is closely hedged”.199
Seen through this lens, Abella J’s reasons in Alberta (Education)
are consistent with her concurring reasons in Rogers. In Rogers, Abella
J advocated for a deferential approach to be taken to decisions made
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by the Copyright Board while maintaining, in Alberta (Education),
that it is the role of the Court to set the limits of legality within which
the Copyright Board may reason, and while setting those limits
more narrowly than Rothstein J thinks is acceptable (based on his
dissenting reasons in Alberta (Education)).
The end result is that post-Alberta (Education), the Copyright
Board is significantly constrained in its ability to shape Canadian
copyright law. Abella J’s reasons for judgment in Alberta (Education)
clarify that the Copyright Board does not have unlimited discretion
under fairness (and fair dealing more broadly) to implement policy
goals or promote values that are inconsistent with the purpose of the
Copyright Act, as interpreted by the SCC.
It can be argued that Canadian copyright law and policy may
suffer as a result of this outcome. If the Copyright Board does have
“specialized expertise”, and if it does “[play] an important role in
achieving the proper balance between [owners and users]”,200 then
it could perhaps have offered interpretations of the purpose of the
Copyright Act different from those set out by the SCC, contributing
to the “wider constitutional project…of public justification…
shared among the legislative, judicial, and executive/administrative
branches.”201 Wildeman refers to this “model of constitutional
ordering” as “‘constitutional pluralism’, wherein all three branches of
government participate in working out the significance of the legal
norms governing the exercise of state power”.202 The ability of the
Copyright Board to contribute to this project, in the context of the
Copyright Act, is limited by Alberta (Education).
Alberta (Education), however, will not necessarily lead to the
marginalization of the Copyright Board, an institution described
by Canadian academics as playing “a crucial but underappreciated
role in shaping Canadian copyright policy”203 and a “pivotal role in
balancing the seesaw of interests in Canada’s copyright playground”.204
Instead, Alberta (Education) can serve as the starting point for a new
era in the history of the Copyright Board and in the development of
Canadian copyright policy. If the Copyright Board responds to the
SCC’s decision in Alberta (Education) by wholeheartedly embracing
the purpose of the Copyright Act, as interpreted by the SCC, it can
become what Abella J envisions based on her judgments in Rogers
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and Alberta (Education)—a body that truly plays an important role
in contributing to Canadian copyright policy by advancing the public
interest in matters of copyright: that fairly rewards copyright owners;
increases and facilitates access to works; and ultimately contributes to
the development of a vibrant public domain. If the Copyright Board
does not seize this opportunity, however, and continues to apply an
approach to copyright that is inconsistent with the purpose of the
Copyright Act as interpreted by the SCC, then Abella J’s reasons for
judgment in Alberta (Education) provide reviewing courts with the
framework through which they can—defensibly and in a manner
consistent with prior jurisprudence—overturn the decisions of the
Copyright Board on the basis that they are unreasonable.
The story of the pentalogy with respect to judicial review of
Copyright Board decisions is thus not a story about inconsistency
and the inadvertent application of an incorrect standard of review.
It is instead a story about the continuing evolution of the SCC’s
interpretation of the purpose of the Copyright Act—from rewarding
and protecting authors and copyright owners, to contributing to the
development of a robust public domain—a process that originated in
Théberge, was advanced in CCH, and was articulated most recently in
the pentalogy; of the fairness analysis and its shift from a discretionary,
open-ended concept to one that is rooted in and shaped by the
purpose of the Copyright Act; and of the tension between the SCC
and the Copyright Board with respect to the proper interpretation of
the purpose of the Copyright Act.
It is a story that points to two possible futures: one of continued
tension between the SCC and the Copyright Board, and one in
which both institutions work together toward a common purpose.
Ultimately, it is up to the Copyright Board to write the epilogue to
the story of the Canadian copyright pentalogy; to determine—based
on whether it chooses to interpret the Copyright Act in a manner
consistent with the purpose of the Copyright Act, as interpreted by
the SCC—the future it wishes for itself.205
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This epilogue may already be partially written. The Copyright Board, subsequent
to the SCC’s decision in Alberta (Education), supra note 2, in which Abella J remitted
the matter for reconsideration in accordance with her reasons, ruled that “[t]
he decision of the Supreme Court is clear and leaves no room for interpretations:
based on the record before the Board and the findings of fact of the Supreme Court,
Category 4 copies [copies made by teachers for distribution to students] constitute
fair dealing for an allowable purpose and as such, are non-compensable. The FTE
rate must be reduced accordingly”, Copyright Board of Canada, Ruling of the Board,
19 September 2012; cited in Ariel Katz, “Copyright Board: Category 4 copies are
fair dealing” Ariel Katz Blog (19 September 2012) <http://arielkatz.org/copyrightboard-category-4-copies-are-fair-dealing/>.
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